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Lefler: Tolkien's Sub-Creation and Secondary Worlds

Introduction
The great Dominican moral theologian, Servais Pinckaers (1995), argues that
there are novelists capable of helping us “to rediscover truth’s riches and
reintegrate them in moral theology” (p. 35). In his seminal work on Christian
ethics, however, he only specifies one such author (Georges Bernanos) and offers
no analysis of his works. In the same vein, the renowned contemporary American
Protestant moral theologian, Stanley Hauerwas (1994), says that the novel is “a
school of virtue” (p.53), and “an irreplaceable resource for training in moral
virtue” (p. 31). Hauerwas provides a detailed sketch of some of Anthony
Trollope’s works as exemplifying what he has in mind. Yet even Hauerwas only
appeals to the novel as a sort of imaginative mirror, albeit perhaps a necessary
mirror, of human life and action, arguing that such virtues as forgiveness are
understood “only when they are depicted through a narrative” (Hauerwas, 1994,
p. 53). Though Hauerwas’s account goes significantly further than Pinckaers’s,
through the inclusion of detailed analysis of particular examples, it remains
essentially empirical. There are demonstrable good effects of reading novels,
Hauerwas would seem to say, so read them. What neither Pinckaers nor
Hauerwas seems especially concerned to do is to show how good fiction does
what it does, when goodness of some kind is brought about in the reader through
the act of reading. As unsatisfying as these two limited accounts may be, they
nevertheless demonstrate that eminent scholars across the theological spectrum
recognize and increasingly give voice to the intuition that fiction, or in other
words, story-telling, can bear importantly on our moral life.
While J. R. R. Tolkien would surely have agreed with both Pinckaers and
Hauerwas about the power of the novel to form human character, he goes much
further in his considerations of precisely how the human imagination functions
through the event of fiction, on both the author’s and the reader’s part. In what
follows, I shall argue that Tolkien’s theory of the relation between author and
reader of fantasy deploys a provocative anthropology: to be human, Tolkien
asserts, is to tell stories. Furthermore, I contend that Tolkien derives this
anthropological conviction directly from Christian theology, namely, from the
doctrine of imago Dei: the claim that man is made in the image of God. Properly
understood and implemented, Tolkien’s theory indicates imagination’s power to
dispose us to right moral action, in the course of natural human development, but
at the same time within an eschatological trajectory, primordially orchestrated and
constantly superintended by divine providence. In support of this claim, it will be
useful initially, however cursorily, to situate Tolkien’s narrative theory against a
wider background. Providing such a comparative context will help to illuminate
one end of a bridge between Tolkien’s theory and the realm of moral psychology.
Moreover, this bridge will gradually become discernible as the analogy between
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two relationships: Reader-Author and Self-Other, or Neighbor, in Christian
theological terms.1 In order to build this bridge, however, it is necessary first to
look somewhat closely at the principal work in which Tolkien sets down his
theory. Consequently, having established a point of departure within the broad
realm of literary theory, I shall undertake a careful analysis of Tolkien’s argument
in the essay entitled “On Fairy Stories.”
Story-Telling as Imitation: Tolkien’s Narrative Theory in Wider Perspective
According to Aristotle (350 BCE/1984), all of the various kinds of poetry are
“modes of imitation,” differing from each other in “means, object or manner” of
imitation (1447a15-18). Insofar as the objects Aristotle has in mind are “actions,
with agents who are necessarily either good men or bad” (1448a1-2), it is evident
that one of the earliest systematic treatments of literary narrative, and still one of
the most influential, identifies the depiction of moral action, whether good or bad,
as central to the crafting of narrative. Prior even to his specification of object as
moral action, however, is Aristotle’s basic insight that narrative is mimetic, or
imitative. Remarkably, this insight has stood the test of twenty-three centuries, no
doubt with variation and qualification along the way, until Claude Lévi-Strauss, a
thinker in many ways quite different from Aristotle, affirms imitation as
fundamental to the human mind’s activity of myth-making. Over against
Aristotle’s claim that artistic narrative imitates things (specifically, moral actions)
in the world, however, Lévi-Strauss (1964) avers that the mind, in the process of
myth-making, is “reduced to imitating itself as object” (p. 10). Curiously enough,
The Raw and the Cooked, from which this quote is taken, was published in 1964,
the same year that Tolkien published the last and fullest version of “On Fairy
Stories.” For Tolkien (1965), too, imitation is indispensable to his theory, but in a
way otherwise almost diametrically opposed to the perspective of Lévi-Strauss.
Whereas Lévi-Strauss (1964) grants Paul Ricoeur’s (1992) assessment of his
project as “Kantism [sic] without a transcendental subject” (Lévi-Strauss, 1964, p.
11), hence envisioning the mind inexorably forced back onto itself as the only
available object for imitation, Tolkien (1965) invokes the transcendental subject
par excellence, God, as the principle upon which his whole narrative theory
depends. In short, according to Tolkien (1965), human story-telling transpires first
and foremost in imitation of God: we tell stories because God does and we are
made in God’s image, as unforgettably recorded in Genesis 1:26-27. Considering
Lévi-Strauss’s (1964) profound impact on Structuralism and the various later
narratological schools to which it gave rise, either by embellishment or reaction,
Tolkien’s place as a narrative theorist in the mid-20th century may be considered
1

A third analogous relationship to which I will have occasion to refer in passing is that between
the analysand and the analyst.
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somewhat unique, deriving as it does, essentially, from an ancient Judeo-Christian
theological intuition.2
Tolkien’s Notions of Sub-Creation, Secondary Belief and Imagination – on
their own terms
In 1939, J. R. R. Tolkien gave the tenth Andrew Lang Lecture, which he titled
“Fairy Stories,” a lecture that Tolkien later expanded and published in essay form.
The Lord of the Rings did not yet exist as such, but, as Tolkien (1965) later noted,
“was beginning to unroll itself and to unfold prospects of labour and exploration
in yet unknown country as daunting to me as to the hobbits” (p. vii). 3 Tolkien
(1965) began his lecture as follows:
I propose to speak about fairy-stories, though I am aware that this is a rash
adventure. Faërie is a perilous land, and in it are pitfalls for the unwary
and dungeons for the overbold. And overbold I may be accounted, for
though I have been a lover of fairy-stories since I learned to read, and have
at times thought about them, I have not studied them professionally. I have
been hardly more than a wandering explorer (or trespasser) in the land,
full of wonder but not of information. (p. 3).
However whimsical an opening chord seems here to have been struck, Tolkien
nevertheless gets quickly down to business and declares his intention to attempt
answers to three questions: What are fairy-stories? What is their origin? And
finally, what is their use? Of greatest import for the current undertaking is
Tolkien’s detailed answer to his third question. Nevertheless, there are aspects of
the earlier parts of Tolkien’s presentation which are indispensable for a thorough

While there is no evidence that Tolkien read Lévi-Strauss’s (1964) The Raw and the Cooked, he
is much concerned with myth, particularly with respect to its complex relationship with folktales.
In marked contrast with Lévi-Strauss (1964), who isolates mythemes as the elemental, and
consequently universal, building blocks of all particular myths, Tolkien (1964) endorses the
position of George Webbe Dasent that “we must be satisfied with the soup that is set before us,
and not desire to see the bones of the ox out of which it has been boiled” (as cited by Tolkien,
1965, p. 19). Terry Eagleton’s (1983) discussion of Structuralism in Literary Theory: An
Introduction is illuminating both for its account of Lévi-Strauss’s significance and for providing a
striking backdrop against which Tolkien’s remarkably dissimilar thought can be compared.
3
“The Introductory Note in Tree and Leaf was Tolkien’s brief preface to his expanded version of
the original lecture, published in 1947 as the essay “On Fairy Stories.” The original edition of this
work was published in London by Allen and Unwin in 1964. All of my citations are from the
American edition, published the following year.
2
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appreciation of what follows and so some account should be taken of what
Tolkien has to say about the nature of fairy-stories and how they came to be.
The Nature of Fairy Stories
For those not familiar with Tolkien’s literary work, it may be surprising to
discover how keen he is to insist that a thoroughgoing realism, albeit of a curious
quality, pervades good fairy-stories. He is in fact irritated by notions of the fairystory that emphasize unreality or untruth. A range of alternative notions might be
effectively summed up by the phrase ‘make-believe,’ whether the operative
narrative mechanism is that of dreams or otherwise. In such cases, the predicate
“never really happened” or even “could not happen” is taken as essential to the
idea of a fairy story. In contrast, Tolkien (1965) observes that:
Faërie contains many things besides elves and fays, and besides dwarfs,
witches, trolls, giants, or dragons: it holds the seas, the sun, the moon, the
sky; and the earth, and all things that are in it: tree and bird, water and
stone, wine and bread, and ourselves, mortal men, when we are enchanted
[emphasis added]. (p. 9)
Leaving aside, for the moment, the precise meaning of the final qualifier, it may
be said that Tolkien (1965) conceives fairy-stories as recognizably describing the
real world, however re-envisioned through the enchanted veil enshrouding Faërie,
“the realm or state in which fairies have their being” (p. 9).
To this fundamental characterization, should be added another, equally
important for Tolkien: true fairy-stories, he urges, have a “strong moral element”
(Tolkien, 1965, p.16). Indeed, he goes so far as to speak of “their inherent
morality” (Tolkien, 1965, p. 16). What Tolkien means here is evidently that the
kinds of stories he has in mind are ones in which human, rational, moral agency
figures centrally. As such, fairy stories pertain as much to the human as to the
fantastic, privileging the interplay of human moral agencies, against a background
implicitly evocative of a transcendent Other, ordering and governing the world for
the ultimate good of all. Whatever merely “natural” elements may feature in these
stories, they are ancillary to the central anthropological dimension. Much less can
Tolkien’s notion of fairy story countenance nihilism, of the sort that becomes
virtually inescapable when the story is “explained away” via “the machinery of
dream” (Tolkien, 1965, p. 13). This inherent moral character is one of the keys to
making sense of Tolkien’s understanding of fairy-stories and fantasy, and crucial,
by extension, to my own further investigations.
Lastly, concerning the nature of fairy-stories, there should be noted two
more themes featuring prominently in Tolkien’s account: human desire and magic
or enchantment. In keeping with his well-attested Christian-Platonic convictions,
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Tolkien’s (1965) notion of fantasy is erotically driven: man’s “primal ‘desires,’”
he says, “lie at the heart of Faërie” (p. 15). Bringing to bear at the same time both
this and the other notion just named, Tolkien (1965) contends that “at least part of
the magic that [the elves or fairies] wield for the good or evil of man is power to
play on the desires of his body and his heart” (p. 8).
The Origins of Fairy Stories
As for the origins of fairy-stories, Tolkien (1965) himself says he must “pass
lightly over the question,” for lack of expertise (presumably historical) (p. 20).
Yet it is here, in delineating the elemental relationship between story-telling and
human language, that Tolkien first introduces his extraordinary idea of subcreation. “The incarnate mind, the tongue and the tale are in our world coeval,”
says Tolkien (1965, pp. 21-22). By the same power, then, whereby man names
things and conceives [other] words to describe them, he invents stories, almost in
the same motion. “New form is made,” he declares, “Faërie begins; Man becomes
a sub-creator” (Tolkien, 1965, p.22). Though he does not at this point unpack an
expression with once more conspicuously Christian-Platonic overtones, he is
manifestly concerned to identify the human capacity in question as in some way
genuinely creative, “the power of making immediately effective by the will the
visions of ‘fantasy’” (Tolkien, 1965, p. 22). Whatever higher and prior act of
creation this one stands under (sub-), it is “sub-creation, rather than either
representation or symbolic interpretation” [emphasis added] (Tolkien, 1965, p.
22). The suggestion here, in no uncertain terms, seems to be that in telling stories,
human makers bring into being things, however elusive, through their deployment
of “mere” words. But what is to be done with such mysterious, shimmering
things? With that question, the heart of Tolkien’s essay is reached. This is the
question of use, which he now rephrases: “What, if any, are the values and
functions of fairy-stories now?” [emphasis in the original] (Tolkien, 1965, p. 33).
The Use of Fairy Stories
Tolkien embarks upon an explanation of the doctrine of sub-creation within a
discussion of children as the typically presumed proper consumers – one might
say “users” – of fairy-stories (Tolkien, 1965, p. 33).4 At this point, he invokes
Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s famous phrase, “willing suspension of disbelief” as a
working description of what Tolkien refers to as literary belief (as cited by
Tolkien, 1965, pp. 36-37). However, Tolkien immediately disputes the adequacy
4

Tolkien takes great issue with this presumption, grounded as he believes it to be, in a false
sentimentalizing or romanticizing of children. For Tolkien, children are merely immature human
beings, lacking the experience of adults, essentially because they have not lived as long. See
Tolkien (1965), p. 34.
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of Coleridge’s description. “When the story-maker’s art is good enough to
produce” this sort of belief, says Tolkien (1965),
what really happens is that the story-maker proves a successful ‘subcreator.’ He makes a Secondary World which your mind can enter. Inside
it, what he relates is ‘true’: it accords with the laws of that world. You
therefore believe it, while you are, as it were, inside.5 The moment
disbelief arises, the spell is broken; the magic, or rather art, has failed.
You are then out in the Primary World again, looking at the little abortive
Secondary World from outside. (p. 37)
Whether or not he has given Coleridge a fair reading, it is clear that Tolkien is
concerned not to underestimate the scope of the imagination’s power as it is
engaged in the act of reading. About this act, it is worth noting here what Paul
Ricoeur (1992) has to say. In his late, great work Oneself as Another, Ricoeur
(1992) describes reading as
… at its best a struggle between two strategies, the strategy of seduction
pursued by the author in the guise of a more or less trustworthy narrator,
with the complicity of the “willing suspension of disbelief” (Coleridge)
that marks the entry into reading, and the strategy of suspicion pursued by
the vigilant reader, who is not unaware of the fact that she brings the text
to meaningfulness thanks to its lacunae, whether these be intended or
not…. (p. 159, n. 23).
Clearly Ricoeur (1992) is more favorably disposed towards Coleridge’s famous
dictum. The ultimate question with which Ricoeur and Tolkien are here
preoccupied, however, is the same: to what extent and in what ways is the reader
affected by the act of reading (particularly, reading fiction)? In the final analysis,
Ricoeur (1992) affirms and even defends “the possibility of applying literature to
life” (p. 159, n. 23).6 Yet he frets over Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of “the
narrative unity of a life,” reminding us warily that “In my own treatment of the
mimetic function of narrative, the break made by the entry of narrative into the
sphere of fiction is taken so seriously that it becomes a very thorny problem to
reconnect literature to life by means of reading” (Ricoeur, 1992, p. 159).7 Tolkien,
in contrast with Ricoeur and arguably in theoretical accord with MacIntyre, does
5

Without, ordinarily, collapsing the primary into the secondary world and so falling into
(pathological) delusion: see, e.g., Tolkien, 1965, pp. 48, 52.
6
It would be difficult to imagine any other conclusion supporting some of the claims Ricoeur
(1992) makes along the way. E.g.: “Characters, we will say, are themselves plots” (p. 143).
7
For MacIntyre’s discussion, see MacIntyre’s (1981) After Virtue, pp. 190-209, et passim.
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not fret. It is fair, of course, to note that Tolkien at this point has mainly
concerned himself with the movement of the mind into the literary realm, not so
much with the reconnection to life that so vexes Ricoeur, but Tolkien will get to
that, too, in the end. For the present, the sub-creator’s Secondary World requires
some further attention in its own right.
One of the most striking aspects of Tolkien’s account is that what inclines
one to linger in the author’s secondary world is not so much its believability –
assessed in terms of correspondence to “real life” – but its desirability. Thus, the
creator of the great Smaug says that as a child “I desired dragons with a profound
desire” (Tolkien, 1965, p. 41). Were dragons true, or real? What mattered more
was that “the world that contained even the imagination of Fáfnir [‘the prince of
all dragons’] was richer and more beautiful, at whatever cost of peril” (Tolkien,
1965, p. 41). In other words, Tolkien (1965) subtly shifts the emphasis in his
phenomenology of reading – at least the reading of fairy-tales – from reason to
will, privileging desire over intellectual evaluation of existential truth-claims.
Though more will have to be said about the later stages of Tolkien’s argument, I
have now assembled, I believe, the tools needed to build my “bridge”: the
proposed parallel between the reader-author relationship in Tolkien’s account and
the relationship between the self and the other or neighbor in psychological and
theological terms.
Implications of Tolkien’s Scheme for Moral Psychology
My analysis here begins with the commonplace intuition that everyone has a story
to tell, or better, in terms more comprehensive and especially amenable to the
post-modern climate, everyone is always about the business of telling his or her
own story. We are, then, perforce the hearers or even “readers” of our neighbor’s
stories. My contention here is that Tolkien’s notion of sub-creation, with its
correlates of Primary and Secondary Worlds and Primary and Secondary Belief,
can be deployed in service of moral psychology, particularly in light of categories
ready to hand in Christian moral philosophy and theology. Furthermore, though a
transparent mapping will not emerge from this analysis, even the disanalogies
between the author-reader and other-self relationships are instructive.
The basic contours of the comparison in question are no doubt rather
obvious: the author of fiction, and especially of fantasy, “makes a Secondary
World,” one possessed, Tolkien (1965) later elaborates, of “the inner consistency
of reality” (p. 46, 47, 48); the human person narrates his story, always intent
(more or less consciously) on persuading others that his version of reality bears at
the very least the mark of inner consistency. “If only you would enter into my
world,” he seems to say to me, “you would find what I relate there to be true.”
And so I find myself invited to “read” a life-story in progress, one replete with its
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own laws and its own dragons; I am beckoned, tempted, cajoled, by the Other-asAuthor, temporarily to let go my hold on the primary world – the real world,
albeit only knowable to me through my own perceptions – in order to enter into
the perspective and, limitedly, the experience of the Other.
All this is highly romantic and would appear congenial to the work of
Heinz Kohut and more recently of David Klugman (2001) on empathy and
intersubjectivity.8 Klugman (2001) seeks to shore up and elaborate on Kohut’s
understanding of psychoanalytic empathy, first by delineating how
intersubjectivity theory develops organically out of Kohut’s thought. Secondly,
and of particular interest for the current discussion, Klugman (2001) invokes the
historical dialectic that arises out of the Enlightenment between Rationalism and
Romanticism. Focusing on the thought of Coleridge, Klugman (2001) aims to
demonstrate the importance of the imagination to intersubjectivity, especially as
operative within the psychoanalytic relationship. When all is said and done, the
notion of romantic empathy articulated by Klugman is roughly analogous to the
reader’s engaging of Secondary Belief in order to enter into the author’s
Secondary World. And yet Klugman’s foundational embrace of Coleridge’s
epistemology is, to this author’s mind, problematic, however useful when put
intelligently at the disposal of the psychotherapeutic process. Though this
profound issue offers intriguing avenues for more extensive exploration, it may at
least be treated summarily here, by appeal to a few of the Christian categories
invoked by Tolkien himself in connection to his theory of literary artifice, and by
some further elaboration on those ideas.
Klugman’s perspective offers, in point of fact, an interesting entrée into
the last phase of the argument of this study, in virtue of the striking contrast
between his and Tolkien’s doctrines of human imagination. According to
Klugman (2001), Coleridge and other Enlightenment philosophers came to
champion the imagination as essentially compensatory in function: into the
vacuum opened up by the gradual demise of metaphysics, imagination sallied
forth, in essence substituting the fertility of the human mind for an increasingly
ephemeral Great Chain of Being.9 Reacting against the Cartesian doctrine of
“irreducible duality between subjective experience and an objective external
world” (Klugman, 2001, p. 692), Coleridge strove “to counteract the passive,
mechanistic models of the mind that relied on Cartesian dualism” (Klugman,
2001, p. 693), insisting that the world in an important sense is “dependent on what
we make of it” (Cavell, as cited by Klugman, 2001, p. 694). And what we make
References to Kohut’s work are made in view of Klugman’s interpretation here.
Even still for Ricoeur (1992), the anxiety to avoid the charge of ontotheology is conspicuous in
his deliberate bracketing of the datum of faith/revelation in Oneself and Another – this
notwithstanding his lifelong commitment to [Protestant] Christian faith. See Ricoeur (1992),
“Introduction.”
8
9
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of it Coleridge believed “depends on the role one assigns to imagination in one’s
perception and ‘creation’ of the world” (Klugman, 2001, p. 694). The irony in all
this painstaking elaboration of a theory of the imagination intended to rescue us
from Cartesian dualism is the extent to which Coleridge (and by implication
Klugman) effectively retains Descartes’s dualistic principle more or less intact:
As with Kant, whose intervening influence on Coleridge is direct and explicit,
human sense experience, filtered as it must always be through the categories,
opens only the most tenuous and unreliable of portals across the subject-object
divide.
For the Catholic Tolkien, on the other hand, things really are, and really
are connected in the world outside our minds, neither created by, nor in any other
way dependent on us for their existence: in a word, the Great Chain of Being, for
the believing Catholic, and indeed according to the Church itself, continues
happily to exist and has suffered no diminution before the onslaught of modern
skepticism. As for the imagination and the related powers of Art and Fantasy10 to
which the Imagination is sub-ordered, these human faculties are divine gifts for
seeing things as they are or ought to be, implanted in human nature by God
himself for the betterment of man and of the world. Indeed, in accord with this
dimension of his rich Catholic anthropology, Tolkien (1981) is able to speak, in a
letter to his son, Christopher, of “Man, the story-teller” (pp. 100-101): storytelling is, Tolkien believes, part and parcel of our very nature as human beings. 11
The theological intuition here, however, runs even deeper: for the reason we are
natural story-tellers is not mere arbitrary divine fiat. Rather, Tolkien cherishes the
notion, congenial to St. Augustine and other great thinkers long before him, that
God himself is a, or rather the great Artist and Story-teller, and since God saw fit
to make man in his own image, it must needs follow that man, too, shall be a
maker, an artist, and a maker of stories. This idea runs through Tolkien’s thought
from at least the 1940s onward, its Christian contours already plainly evident in
10

Drawing together the threads of his own argument, Fantasy could be defined as that power
which achieves “a quality of strangeness and wonder in the Expression” of the fairy-story, to
which the sub-creator’s more fundamental art has given the inner consistency of reality. Cf.
Ricoeur, 1992, p. 47.
11
In a critical essay called “The Storyteller”, Walter Benjamin (1936/1969) grounds the art of
storytelling in “the ability to exchange experiences” (p. 83), and because he believes “the
communicability of experience is decreasing” (p. 86), he perceives as inevitable “the decline of
storytelling” (p. 87). If Benjamin (1936) were correct, this would be a lamentable state of affairs.
Yet Tolkien’s (1965) view implicitly denies this possibility on ontological grounds. Benjamin’s
(1936/1969) position here is the more curious, given his robustly metaphysical understanding of
human language in his retelling of the biblical fall in “On Language as Such and the Language of
Man” (Benjamin, 1916/2004). On the other hand, Tolkien (1965) would almost certainly agree
with Benjamin about the general decline of storytelling as a cultural and literary phenomenon. But
to the extent that he granted such a decline, he would necessarily see it as a debasing of human
nature itself.
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the letter of November, 1944, cited above. In its most detailed and elegant
expression, it majestically crowns the 1947 edition of “On Fairy Stories,” where it
constitutes the dominant theme of the Epilogue.12
Pursuing this line of reasoning somewhat further, it could be argued that
Coleridge’s “suspension of disbelief” is, like his whole doctrine of imagination, a
compensatory gesture, if not a subtle counsel of despair (as cited by Ricoeur,
1992, p. 159). In contrast, Tolkien’s (1965) doctrine of sub-creation is expressive
of his deeply sacramental intuition – of the reality, not to mention intrinsic
meaningfulness, of things. Indeed, the robustness of the reality of things outside
the mind is such, Tolkien (1965) is convinced, that their translation into the world
of Faërie loses far less than our enlightened sensibilities incline us to believe: “it
holds water and stone, wine and bread, and ourselves, mortal men, when we are
enchanted” (p. 9). Consequently, Tolkien’s literary theory, rooted in precisely that
conviction regarding the reliability of Being which Kant, Coleridge, et al have
reckoned untenable, grants him access to worlds deeper and richer than many the
most fertile Modernized imagination can discover. Quite simply, Tolkien’s worlds
are more real, because they depend on, rather than dissolving that Chain of Being
the thinkers of first the Protestant Reformation and subsequently the
Enlightenment called increasingly into question. Tolkien believes he is writing
about real things in the world, not merely, or even mostly, mental things. To
return briefly to Ricoeur (1992) and MacIntyre (1981), this same intellectual split
could possibly account for Ricoeur’s anxiety on the one hand, and MacIntyre’s
sangfroid on the other, when faced with the prospect so daunting to the modern
philosophic mind of bringing literature to bear directly on life. Ricoeur cannot
ultimately shake off the barren nominalist metaphysics of his Protestant
sensibilities, whereas MacIntyre, the Catholic convert and student of Aquinas, has
at his disposal the richest possible account in St. Thomas’s Summa of Being and
Existence, an account still unfettered by modern epistemology, much less by the
hermeneuts of suspicion.13 Be that as it may, if Tolkien’s Faërie is as densely real
as I have tried to indicate here, then our own self-narratives and those of others
are revealed, a fortiori, to be ‘thicker,’ denser, in a word, more real, than
Coleridge’s compensatory suspension may be able to countenance, much less
enter into.
For further consideration of Tolkien’s argument in the Epilogue, see the section “The Problem
of Credulity,” below.
13
The claim tentatively ventured here regarding the genealogy “nominalism-Protestant
Reformation-Enlightenment” as the engine that evacuates classical metaphysics, tending to set a
stark “either-or” in its place, is sufficiently common not to require further annotation. For anyone
interested, however, a good retailing of this narrative is available in Pickstock, 1998.
12
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Klugman’s efforts to recover some of the power of human imagination in
service of the empathetic therapeutic relationship are admirable, especially in
view of what Klugman and others might consider overly rationalistic, if not
occasionally scientistic approaches of some strands of modern psychology and
psychotherapy. Yet the interpersonal communication grounded in Tolkien’s
robust, old-fashioned metaphysics – when his conception of authorial
communication is applied analogically to personal relations in general, but by all
means including the psychoanalytic dyad – has the potential to excel Klugman’s
model in proportion as the real exceeds the ideal.
Where I have admittedly embellished Tolkien’s account somewhat is in
the proposal that man’s inveterate story-telling must surely compass not only his
detached literary fictions but his own most intimate self-narration. Granted,
however, that the line of speculation I have opened up here is one almost certainly
not intended by him, it is nevertheless ultimately defensible on grounds of his
own Christian anthropology, as I have already suggested. Moreover, there is at
least one striking hint of this trajectory in Tolkien’s thought within his own
discussion of the uses of fairy-stories. Under the heading of “Recovery,” he
writes: “[The trite or familiar things, including ‘faces, and yet unique faces…’]
have become like the things which once attracted us by their glitter, or their
colour, or their shape, and we laid hands on them, and then locked them in our
hoard, acquired them, and acquiring ceased to look at them…. Creative fantasy…
may open your hoard and let all the locked things fly away like cage-birds”
(Tolkien, 1965, pp. 57-58). Here Tolkien (1965) himself bridges the gap between
the fictional secondary-world-notion and real-world relations between oneself and
others. Given more time, both “recovery” and “escape” in Tolkien’s
schematization of the benefits of literary fantasy could be shown to have profound
Christian theological correlates in interpersonal relations. For the present, it is
sufficient to have shown that the proposal under consideration here is thoroughly
congruent with, even nascent in, Tolkien’s thought without ever being
consciously entertained by him as a discrete application of his literary theory.
As I have already acknowledged, my proposal raises some interesting
problems. Indeed, some of the most provocative aspects of the argument may well
lie in the problems. And so, as I move towards my conclusion, I would like to
take up two of these problems very briefly and attempt provisional and just-asbrief solutions.
The Problem of Empathy
The first problem could be termed a problem of “empathy,” the very notion at the
heart of the psychoanalytic investigation considered above. Curiously enough,
upon encountering such arguments within the fields of clinical psychology and
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psychotherapy, the confessional Christian may seem at first to find herself in
agreement with Kohut and Klugman’s rationalist opponents. For if many
clinicians today worry that “empathy” applied as therapy ultimately leaves both
analyst and analysand floundering in a subjective sea, the approach is equally
suspect from the point of view of the Christian commandment, which is simply –
and sweepingly – to love one’s neighbor, not to sympathize with him, much less
to accord my Secondary Belief to his Secondary World. Indeed, from the
perspective of moral philosophy one must surely take heed here of Max Scheler’s
(1954) warning that, “One of the gravest errors of almost the entire school of
British moralists lies in their departure from Greek and Christian ethics in seeking
to derive the facts of love and hate from fellow-feeling” (p. 140).14
As a preliminary answer to a complex question, I would first recall the
eloquent appeal of the renowned Christian phenomenologist, Gabriel Marcel
(1964) when he wrote:
It may also turn out that submerging oneself suddenly in the life of another
person and being forced to see things through his eyes, is the only way of
eliminating the self-obsession from which one has sought to free oneself.
Alone, one cannot succeed in this, but the presence of the other person
accomplishes this miracle, provided one gives one’s consent to it and does
not treat it as a simple intrusion – but as a reality (p. 51).15
Note Marcel’s emphasis on reality as a legitimate, even the proper, description of
the Other’s life and experience. In addition, one should recall Tolkien’s intriguing
insistence on the inherent strong moral element of good fairy-stories: though the
waters of the human psyche are dark and dangerous, I would like to suggest,
putting together the insights of Marcel and Tolkien, that the attentive “Reader”
may well risk – or, risk well – such a submersion, trusting, sometimes blindly, in
the foundational goodness of created human nature that always in-forms his
neighbor’s life-story, no matter how twisted it may seem to have become in years
of telling. Indeed, should the reader grant the “inherent morality” of “true” fairy
stories, I would challenge him to honor the logic of my working analogy and
ascribe such inherent morality, prima facie, to our fellow-human being’s selftelling. If the presumptions behind such an ascription appear daunting, its fruit
promises to be commensurately rich.

14

A generation later, Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) builds his detailed critique of emotivism on the
same fundamental intuition, though he does not cite Scheler (pp. 11-34).
15
Cf. also: “The proper function of the subject is to emerge from itself and realize itself primarily
in the gift of oneself [and in the various forms of creativity]” (Marcel, 1964, p. 49).
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In any case, such a spiritual – or for that matter, psychoanalytic – prescription as
this line of reasoning entails appears to resonate strongly with the
“intersubjectivity” endorsed by Klugman and others, notwithstanding the
reservations expressed earlier concerning Klugman’s appropriation of Coleridge’s
doctrine. If so, then once again one may discern the applicability of Tolkien’s
scheme to the specialized context of the analyst-analysand relationship, as much
as to the more general relation between any two persons. This way of thinking
invites a further extraordinary Tolkienian insight: in the letter to which I have
already referred, Tolkien (1981) reasons that “man the story-teller would have to
be redeemed in a manner consonant with his nature: by a moving story” (p. 100).
This suggests that entering willingly (with all proper provisos in place) into the
lesser “moving stories” of our fellow men, may, by extension and participation in
the one Great Story, told by the Divine Story-teller, constitute a co-redemptive
activity, an expression of what amounts in Thomistic terms to the cooperative
deployment of gratuitous grace, whereby we help each other to accomplish God’s
providential design for all (Aquinas, 1948, I-II, q.111, a.1, c).
The Problem of Credulity
I will note just one more problem, one at first blush more serious than that posed
by empathy, but the solution to which would appear to be a further elaboration on
what has just been said. The problem is this: the writer of fantasy knows he is
writing fiction and intends such. The teller of his own life story, on the other
hand, more or less believes in the truth of that story. In short, there typically exists
a disparity between the two kinds of story-tellers in regard to their dispositions
towards the truth-values of their respective stories. To be sure, both desire, one
may even say require, their hearer’s belief in order to achieve what they intend in
the telling. But whereas the good of that belief, when achieved, redounds to the
additional good of the one who listens to the fantasy being told (in the form of
entertainment, escape, edification, consolation, etc.), in the case of the teller of his
own story the good of belief redounds only – by typical design – to himself: in a
word, believing in our own stories, on the whole and most of the time, is fairly
vital for psychic survival. As a result, the analogy to the fiction author’s
Secondary World would appear to be severely jeopardized: whereas the writer of
fantasy seeks to evoke only Secondary Belief from his reader, we ardently desire
Primary Belief of our own stories and whether explicitly or implicitly,
consciously or unconsciously, plead for the same unconditioned belief of others.
How does this significant incongruence between the two sides of our working
comparison not embarrass or even disqualify my whole analogy?16
16

Can the parallel be adjusted and so salvaged? Ought this to be done? How does the disanalogy
differ between the teller/author and the hearer/reader’s perspectives? These questions, insofar as
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It may be that the kernel of the solution to this problem – and it is not one
for the faint of heart, but one that may in the end “cost not less than everything”
(Eliot, 1943/2000) – lies precisely in Tolkien’s final move, in the Epilogue to his
magisterial essay. There, Tolkien suddenly, as if without forethought, envisages
the Christian Gospel as the one true fairy story. In this singular case, what might
initially be encountered from within Tolkien’s typology as another secondary
world (i.e., the stereoscopic narrative comprised by the four Gospels), proves to
be primary with a vengeance: primary at a new level, for the fairy-story that God
tells is the truest of all stories, whose Happy Ending is eternal life! Yet it is hardly
self-evident how to square this claim with the vexing myriad of credulous selfstory-tellers, all of whom persist in more or less believing their own stories, often
heedless of the fact that one’s own story and the stories of others are mutually
exclusive, much less integrable into any sort of coherent grand narrative.
However, in service of a preliminary attempt to do so, I would urge a possible
application of the rich philosophical insight of Robert Sokolowski, a leading
exponent of the thought of Edmund Husserl. If for the sake of argument one
grants Tolkien’s proposal to read the Gospel narrative as the one true fairy-story,
told in all its grandeur by God Himself, then by extension the secondary worlds of
all [human] story-tellers, ourselves and all others-to-ourselves, become what
Sokolowski (1994) calls manifolds or “presentational dimensions” of the real
world in motion towards its telos (p. 201). According to Sokolowski (1994),
“presentational dimensions in being” are the “structures of intentionality,”
including such modes of presentation as “naming and the nameable, viewing and
the viewable, … predication and the predicable,” etc. (p. 201). Moreover, among
such dimensions of “disclosure” or presentation, Sokolowski (1994) also includes
“intersubjective experience.” His argument at this point is highly suggestive in the
present context and warrants fuller quotation:
As we experience things, we realize, with greater and greater finesse, that
the things we experience are also given to other datives of manifestation,
other centers of awareness. We gradually differentiate between our view
on things and the views others have. It is not that we just become aware of
other cognitive beings and differentiate ourselves from them; it is that the
things we know take on a new dimension as we see them as also seeable
by others. The child does not only recognize its mother; it also becomes
aware that the things it sees are also seen by the mother. Things become
enhanced in their viewability, in the manifold of ways in which they can
be manifested. Their identity also becomes enhanced, since there is more
identity to them when they are known to be seen from viewpoints other
they warrant in-depth reflection and their own careful articulation, take us once more beyond the
scope of the current, introductory endeavor.

http://scholar.valpo.edu/journaloftolkienresearch/vol4/iss2/1

14

Lefler: Tolkien's Sub-Creation and Secondary Worlds

than the one we have. We come to see this dimension of intersubjective
presentability in them. (Sokolowski, 1994, p. 202)
Bringing together Sokolowski’s insights with Tolkien’s theological narratology,
my own moral psychological analysis uncovers the possibility that the individual
makers of sundry secondary worlds may gradually become collaborative subcreators, their own stories ever more clearly belonging to the one, great story of
the world. Furthermore, speaking in inadequate historical terms, this process does
not take place strictly in the present, but proleptically, in eschatological
anticipation of a perfected world not yet fully realized.
The systematic-theological speculation set forth here builds as I have
suggested upon Robert Sokolowski’s creative extrapolations from Husserlian
phenomenology.17 In the end, however, Tolkien (1977) supplies the pure, elven
insight in Ainulindalë, his exquisite account of creation at the beginning of the
posthumously published Silmarillion.18 In that extraordinarily original
embroidering on Christian Neoplatonic insight, the themes that make up Ilúvatar’s
cosmological symphony are unveiled to his angelic sub-creators as the myriad
interwoven lives – stories – of his elder and younger Children, Elves and Men:
But when they were come into the Void, Ilúvatar said to them: ‘Behold
your Music!’ And he showed to them a vision, giving to them sight where
before was only hearing; and they saw a new World made visible before
them, and it was globed amid the Void, and it was sustained therein, but
was not of it. And as they looked and wondered this World began to
unfold its history, and it seemed to them that it lived and grew. And when
the Ainur had gazed for a while and were silent, Ilúvatar said again:
‘Behold your Music!’ This is your minstrelsy; and each of you shall find
contained herein, amid the design that I set before you, all those things
which it may seem that he himself devised or added. And thou, Melkor,
wilt discover all the secret thoughts of thy mind, and wilt perceive that
they are but a part of the whole and tributary to its glory. (Tolkien, 1977,
p. 17)
Sokolowski’s (1994) discussion at pp. 200-205 is particularly relevant here, though I am
indebted to the entire work, and to Sokolowski’s thought in general, for my own ongoing efforts to
describe the world accurately and so come to understand and articulate truth in compelling ways.
18
This is not to mention – as aficionados will attest – the quite literal first-foliating of Tolkien’s
thought along these lines in the story “Leaf by Niggle,” which Tolkien deliberately published in
tandem with “On Fairy Stories” in Tree and Leaf. For the reader familiar with Niggle’s adventure,
the numerous points of contact between this last passage of my argument and Tolkien’s
magnificent story will be plain to see.
17
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As the angelic acts of sub-creation have been taken up into the one Creative Act
of Ilúvatar, so are our stories being taken up and woven into the single,
magnificent story of our Maker. And just as God incorporates even the discordant
themes of the archangelic rebel, Melkor along with the rest, so even our bad
intentions and acts, from the petty to the fiendish, will in the end constitute so
many, mostly minute, episodes in the divine master-drama. In regard, then, to the
problem of the disparities identified above, between the Author-Reader relation
and the ordinary interpersonal human dyad, the solution suggested here amounts
to a willingness to entertain the outrageous, very un-modern, fantasy of an ancient
Metanarrative – or, to retain the musical metaphor, to attune ourselves to the
mysterious super-sonic transposition into a higher key: as already proposed, we
are deeply involved, seemingly willy-nilly and indubitably like-it-or-not, in each
other’s story-telling enterprises, each of which is only one passage or theme in the
narrative that includes all others, the grandest and most beautiful Story of all. If,
then, finally, one has somehow become earnestly so attuned, or is even willing so
to entertain – if one so much as desires that the fond fancy of a grand cosmic fairy
story with a joyous happy ending might turn out to be true, why would one opt,
concertedly or systematically, for the way of Melkor?
There is, in fact, a way in which the erotics of Tolkien’s theory, previously
noted, may here provide yet another link between the reading of well-made
fantasy and the mature engagement of interpersonal relationships. For the greatest
desire of the reader is for the joy of the happy ending – what Tolkien (1965) terms
eucatastrophe, “the sudden joyous ‘turn’” (p. 68). And qua “reader” himself, the
author shares this desire. So, too, in point of fact, does every teller of his own
unfolding life-story. Yet there is one further desire cherished by the author of
fiction and entertained by all serious readers, namely, that perhaps someday, some
“specially beautiful fairy-story,” crowned with the happiest of happy endings,
might turn out to be “‘primarily’ true…” (Tolkien, 1965, p. 72). From the
Christian perspective, the Gospel has turned out to be this story. But if the fairystory of the gifted story-teller answers to the reader’s primal desires, for truth as
much as for dragons, may we not enter into each other’s muddled, magical stories
ardently desiring that they may increasingly become real, true, harmonious
threads of the One Story, whose Happy Ending we await in hope?
Conclusion
I should like to conclude with my own whimsical, and no doubt rather wistful,
plea: quite simply, to read stories. In the closing pages of his epoch-making essay,
Leisure: The Basis of Culture, Josef Pieper (1952/1963) embraces the paradox of
his own project in terms that find a strong parallel in Tolkien’s prescription for
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fairy-tales: Pieper (1952/1963) offers a philosophical diagnosis of the ills of our
civilization and sketches a kind of antidote, but acknowledges that it is precisely
the nature of philosophy not to be ordered to another [practical] end, and by
extension, that true leisure cannot be acquired by setting out to acquire it, having
recognized that it is what is so badly needed for the mending of our world.19
Similarly, Tolkien (1965) hints that we – adults – desperately need to read fantasy
(fiction, etc.), and yet he is quite clear, paradoxically, that fantasy can only fulfill
its inner meaning and destiny if it is engaged for its own sake, for the joy of
reading, not for the purpose of consolation. “Children are meant to grow up, and
not to become Peter Pans. Not to lose innocence and wonder, but to proceed on
the appointed journey: that journey upon which it is certainly not better to travel
hopefully than to arrive, though we must travel hopefully if we are to arrive”
(Tolkien, 1965, p. 44-45). No one can make a child grow up. This is surely one of
the great wonders, at times seemingly tragic, of our strange human existence. But
fairy-tales may help us to grow, and may help us to help our children and others
to grow up as well. And if reading fairy stories teaches us to enter imaginatively
into the experience of others and helps us to love them more as we arduously craft
our own enchanted narratives, so much the better.
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